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Introduction: ‘Mood Disorders’ as Historical Problem
Despite the increasingly widespread availability of psychotropics believed to restore
biochemical equilibrium in the brains of persons diagnosed with mood disorders,
1
the number of people suffering from such medical conditions appears to be increas-
ing. According to The Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘by 2020 it is estimated
that depression will be the second most common disabling condition in the world’,
a figure it derives from the World Health Organization.
2 Depression is, it seems,
rapidly becoming a global threat. In a trend that is mirrored in much of the West,
the number of prescriptions dispensed for antidepressants in the UK has doubled in
the last decade and is continuing to rise. The need for a critical perspective on
mood disorders is growing.
At the start of the millennium, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen lamented the ‘epistemic
timidity’ of historians of psychiatry, when they ‘are in fact in a position of saying some-
thing of capital importance about the subject of mental illness.’
3 Reiterating this, I want
to suggest that historians of psychiatry are best suited to provide a critical perspective on
mood disorders and that they must continue to broaden and deepen their research field in
order to do so.
We can begin by considering how the concept of ‘mood disorders’ emerged in the
early decades of the nineteenth century. Such a history must also be a history of the
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393emotions and of the sciences that investigate these. Moreover, as with any history
concerned with disease concepts,
4 historians of psychiatry must pay close attention to
nosological texts in tracing how psychiatric categories were created in relation to clinical
practices and to other realms of medical science. Finally, our inquiry must incorporate
contemporaneous developments in experimental neurophysiology that nineteenth-
century psychiatrists, particularly in Germany and Britain, drew extensively upon to
explain how emotions functioned and could become diseased.
Twenty-first century psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists are fond of looking
to the nineteenth century in support of claims for continuity and universality of present
knowledge about the emotions and their disorders.
5 Historians, too, have attempted to
establish parallels between today’s clinical depression and nineteenth-century conditions
such as melancholia and neurasthenia.
6 Such claims should not, however, be taken for
granted, nor are the presumed links inevitable.
This paper provides a short narrative on how melancholia was reconceptualised by an
influential German psychiatrist, Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–68), in the middle of the
nineteenth century. He drew on neurophysiological work on the sensory–motor reflex,
applying the reflexive model to the realm of ideas and emotions in order to situate the
recently created category, ‘affective insanity’, within a biomedical framework. Through
the metaphor of reflexive action, the emotions could be explained as the result of a
potentially involuntary mental process with the ability to become disordered. Nine-
teenth-century melancholia, conceptualised within this framework, was specific to a par-
ticular historical moment – it had its own regime of somatisation and biologisation, and
its own aetiology and trajectory. It follows that if the historical specificity of nineteenth-
century biomedical melancholia can be demonstrated, depression as a universal condition
must equally become open to re-interpretation and be subjected to closer historical inves-
tigation.
4I broadly follow Adrian Wilson’s approach in
this regard: Adrian Wilson, ‘On the History of
Disease-Concepts: The Case of Pleurisy’, History of
Science, 38, 3 (2000), 271–319.
5Examples abound, such as Rebecca Fox-
Spencer and Alan Young, A Simple Guide to
Depression (Long Hanborough: CFS Medical
Communications, 2005), 34–5; Michael Alan Taylor
and Max Fink, Melancholia: The Diagnosis,
Pathophysiology, and Treatment of Depressive
Illness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 1–7; Allan V. Horowitz and Jerome C.
Wakefield, The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry
Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive
Disorder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
53–4: 61–71; Dan J. Stein, David J. Kupfer and Alan
F. Schatzberg (eds), The American Psychiatric
Publishing Textbook of Mood Disorders
(Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing,
2006). This claim for continuity is presented in
unusual detail in a collaborative project between an
historian and a psychiatrist: Conrad M. Swartz and
Edward Shorter, Psychotic Depression (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). It should be
noted that the ’discovery’ of depression is usually
traced further back than the 1800s, often to
Antiquity. There is, however, insufficient space here
to address the many problems arising from attempts
to link modern depression to a multitude of pre- and
early modern afflictions.
6For example, Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia
and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to
Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986); Judith Misbach and Henderikus Stam,
‘Medicalizing Melancholia: Exploring Profiles of
Psychiatric Professionalization’, J o u r n a lo ft h e
History of the Behavioural Sciences, 42, 1 (Winter
2006), 41–59; Janet Oppenheim, ‘Shattered
Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in
Victorian England (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991).
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emerges is a continuity of language which facilitates the idea of disordered emotions
as scientifically sound in the twenty-first century. Griesinger’s metaphor has survived
to the present, providing a linguistic template that allows for ‘mood disorders’ to exist
as a plausible and meaningful medical concept.
The Emergence of Disordered Emotions
German Berrios has suggested that:
[Up] to the Napoleonic Wars, melancholia was but a rag-bag of insanity states whose only
common denominator was the presence of a few (as opposed to many) delusions. In practice,
therefore, it is highly likely that it included cases of schizophrenia. Sadness and low affect
(which were no doubt present in some cases) were not considered as defining symptoms.
Indeed, states of non-psychotic depression, of the type that nowadays would be classified as
DSM IV ‘Major Depressive Episode’ would not have been called ‘melancholia’ at all. During
the eighteenth century these states were classified as ‘vapours’, ‘spleen’, or ‘hypochondria’,
i.e. what Cullen called ‘neuroses’, and Sydenham and Willis, the previous century, had called
‘nervous disorders’.
7
‘Retrospective diagnosis’ is a practice from which historians of medicine often seek to
distance themselves, yet few have questioned the claim that clinical depression has
always been part of the human condition, albeit under a variety of names. It is tempting
to take for granted that as humans we have been subject to and are capable of the same
kinds of emotions throughout our history and that that, in fact, is a large part of what
makes us human. However, historians of the emotions have suggested that emotional
repertoires change over time and between societies.
8 Moreover, as Thomas Dixon has
shown, ‘emotions’ as a concept has its own history. It emerged within the context of
modern psychology, gradually replacing older terms such as passions, appetites, and sen-
timents that had belonged to and made sense within a world-view where Christianity was
the dominant source of knowledge. As ways of understanding the human mind and body
were profoundly transformed within a modern scientific framework, ‘the emotions’ as an
all-compassing category and process that was at once physiological and psychological –
and not necessarily subject to volition – soon eclipsed its spiritual predecessors in
medico–scientific literature.
9
When investigating how mental disease categories emerge and function, historians of
psychiatry cannot, however, confine themselves to considering external symptoms – in
7German E. Berrios, The History of Mental
Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology since the
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 299.
8See Karin Johannisson, Melankoliska rum: om
a ˚ngest, leda och sa ˚rbarhet i fo ¨rfluten tid och nutid
(Stockholm: Albert Bonniers, 2009); Barbara H.
Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions in History’,
American Historical Review, 107 (June 2002),
821–45.
9Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The
Creation of a Secular Psychological Category
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See
also Roger Smith, ‘The History of Psychological
Categories’, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 1 (March
2005), 55–94.
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central to their history. In this way, depression, as presently understood, has a descriptive
psychopathological component, based on ‘symptoms’ patients express; but an equally
important, and defining, part of this condition is that it is understood as a biochemical
imbalance, which can potentially be corrected with antidepressants. Following from
this, one cannot simply equate nineteenth-century melancholia and twentieth- and
twenty-first-century depression either with each other or with the nervous disorders of
the seventeenth century, or the neuroses of the eighteenth.
With the rise of a new brand of European psychiatry in the middle of the century
melancholia was reconfigured as an emotional disorder with a neurophysiological basis.
Wilhelm Griesinger was one of the early figures central to bringing about this develop-
ment. His system of classification awarded a comparatively prominent place to melanch-
olia, which he viewed as the most treatable form of madness. What has been curiously
overlooked, however, is how Griesinger came to arrive at his conceptualisation of
melancholia as a biomedical disorder of the emotions.
10 A closer look at his theory of
disordered emotions sheds light on how the concept of mood disorders became possible
and plausible. It also highlights differences rather than uniformity where melancholia
and clinical depression are concerned, suggesting that these are two distinct disease
concepts whose historical trajectories demand close and critical inquiry, and which it
is the business of historians of psychiatry to trace and explicate.
In constructing his psychiatric nosology, Griesinger drew to an extent on the work of
earlier mental scientists, particularly Esquirol and Guislain, as well as on his own clinical
experience. However, in arriving at an internal, biomedical model for mental disease, he
primarily found his inspiration in experimental neurophysiology, particularly the work of
Johannes Mu ¨ller. The latter’s concept of mental reflex was at the heart of the model
Griesinger put forward, proving the foundation for his understanding of how the emo-
tions could become diseased.
With experiments carried out on living animals by nineteenth-century physiologists
the concept of reflex action was dressed in the language of modern empirical science.
11
Mu ¨ller built on the sensory–motor reflex arc developed by Marshall Hall early in the
century. Hall, however, rejected the idea that the brain might be involved in reflex
action, marking the medulla as the final destination point for external stimuli. Mu ¨ller dis-
agreed on this point, since his experiments led him to believe that there must be cerebral
involvement in the reaction that occurred. He proposed a reflex occurring in the mind, a
model which was soon extended beyond a model for external sensation triggering bodily
10Historians have noted the significance of the
mental reflex for developments in nineteenth-century
psychopathology, but its role in the creation of
emotional disorders has not been considered in any
detail. See L.S. Jacyna, ‘Somatic Theories of Mind
and the Interest of Medicine in Britain, 1850–1879’,
Medical History, 26 (1982), 235–40 and Roger Smith,
Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of
Mind and Brain (London: Free Association Books,
1992), 42–55.
11For a history of the reflex in modern science see
Georges Canguilhem, The Vital Rationalist: Selected
Writings from Georges Canguilhem (New York: Zone
Books, 1994): Ch. 8, ‘The Concept of Reflex’. For a
different, but equally brilliant historical approach to
reflex action, see Jean Starobinski, Action and
Reaction: The Life and Adventures of a Couple (New
York: Zone Books, 2003).
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396movement into the realm of ideas.
12 This emerging neurophysiological mental reflex
would provide an explanatory framework for how the emotions were produced.
In an 1843 article published two years prior to the first edition of his influential text-
book, Griesinger sought to explain mental, and particularly emotional, functioning
through the reflex concept. The paper ‘Ueber psychische Reflexactionen’
13 has received
scant attention by historians,
14 despite laying the foundation for Griesinger’s vastly influ-
ential psychiatric nosology.
Griesinger’s Pathology of Ideas and Emotions: From Mental Reflex
to Cerebral Irritation
Griesinger followed Mu ¨ller in suggesting that the brain is involved in reflex action,
arguing in addition to this that sensation could pass through the brain, triggering reaction,
without alerting consciousness. Moreover, such transmission of unconscious sensation is
conducted more smoothly and efficiently than that involving the will. All impressions,
however, whether registered in the awareness or not, are collected in the brain, where
they are transformed into ideas, or mental images [Vorstellungen]:
Some sensations do not reach the consciousness, and others do. Both kinds of impressions form the
totality of all exciting factors [Erregungen] of the central organ [the brain]; the entire content of the
sensory site of the latter is equal to the content of all centripetal impressions.... The central organ
does not hold these impressions in individual fibres, but produces from all of them, continuously, a
script [Facit] containing the summary of all excitations. When this state is seemingly calm it reg-
ulates and upkeeps the tone [of the brain].... The centripetal impressions from the immediate site
(the mental organ [Sinnesorgane]), and from the remote regions (from the spinal marrow outwards)
are dispersed in the brain, where they undergo a further change and become the source of Vorstel-
lungen.
15
The metaphor of a Facit, being the summary of all (external and internal) sensory
impressions, allows Griesinger to describe how the mind operates. The Facit contains
all mental information, some of which has passed through the consciousness, and some
that has been stored without triggering awareness. All these impressions are capable of
reacting upon one another, and in doing so they have the ability to synthesise and create
new ideas (Vorstellungen). Such Vorstellungen are wholly endogenous, and may be
utterly unrelated to any external stimuli. Moreover, ideas are kept in ‘mental storages’
[geistigen Vorraths], and when new impressions reach the brain from outside, these
are prone to react with the previously stored images to produce new ones.
16
12Johannes Mu ¨ller, Elements of Physiology,
Vol. I (London: Taylor and Walton, 1840), 765–95,
and Vol. II: The Physiology of the Senses, Voice,
and Muscular Motion, with the Mental
Faculties (London: Taylor and Walton, 1848),
1354–64.
13Wilhelm Griesinger, ‘Ueber psychische
Reflexactionen: Mit einem Blick auf das Wesen der
psychischen Krankheiten’, Gesammelte
Abhandlungen, Erstes Band: Psychiatrische
Abhandlungen (Amsterdam: E.J. Bonnet, 1968).
14A important exception being: Edwin Clarke and
L.S. Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of
Neuroscientific Concepts (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1987).
15Griesinger, op. cit. (note 13), 11–12. [Author’s
translation]
16Ibid., 24.
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duce from any combination of these entirely new impressions and mental images, which
is the source of mental disease. When an increasing number of negative impressions are
stored and these react both with further external irritants and with each other internally,
the brain is subjected to repeated ‘irritation’ [Reize]. Eventually, the process of mental
reaction – the reflexive action – becomes distorted, and subsequently diseased. The brain
begins to produce morbid reactions, such as feelings of displeasure [Unlust], in response
to factors that would not trigger such reactions in a healthy mind.
17
There are, then, two metaphors at work here which together make up Griesinger’s
model for the emotions: a script containing mental images, or ideas, and the ability of
these ideas to react upon one another though a process similar to sensory–motor reflex
action. The mental reflex as expounded by Griesinger was subsequently taken up by
other European psychiatrists, such as Henry Maudsley in Britain, and Richard von
Krafft-Ebing in Germany,
18 and came to constitute a central element in the biomedical
psychiatry of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. It provided the necessary mechanism
by which milder forms of insanity – disorders of affect – could be explained. These
were conditions which did not normally turn up lesions of the brain during psychiatric
autopsies,
19 thus it offered a way of explaining milder forms of insanity within a medi-
co–scientific – in this case neurophysiological – framework.
Conclusion
For Griesinger, the starting point for all forms of insanity was the ‘states of mental
depression’ which included hypochondria, and simple and delusional melancholia.
20
These formed the first pathological stage to be induced by morbid reflex action resulting
from persistent irritation of the brain. If left untreated, melancholia could and often did
deteriorate into mania and later dementia, an idea that can be found in the writings
of a number of prominent British mental scientists in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
Nineteenth-century biomedical melancholia bears little resemblance to today’s depres-
sion. The former is a disorder of the emotions where the intellect remains largely unaf-
fected in the early stages of the disease. External and internal stimuli react upon the
brain, cause irritation, and produce morbid emotional reactions. This leads to low
mood, introspection, and despair, often accompanied by intense feelings of guilt and
17Ibid., 24–5; see also Wilhelm Griesinger,
Mental Pathology and Therapeutics, 2nd edn (New
York: William Wood & Co, 1882), 23–4.
18Henry Maudsley, The Physiology and
Pathology of Mind (London: Macmillan, 1867) and
‘The Cerebral Cortex and Its Work’, Mind, 58 (1890),
161–90; Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Melancholie:
Eine Klinische Studie (Erlangen: Ferdinand Enke,
1874), 1–6, 9–11. For instance, William Sankey used
the model as early as 1863 to explain the aetiology of
melancholia, and a similar explanation through the
mental reflex was expressed by Thomas Clouston in
the 1890s. Thomas S. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on
Mental Diseases, 5th edn (London: J & A Churchill,
1898), 14–15, 27–30; W.H.O. Sankey, ‘On
Melancholia’, Journal of Mental Science, 9 (1863),
193–4.
19Griesinger himself addressed this problem in
his textbook: Griesinger, Mental Pathology, op. cit.
(note 17), 4–5, 409–12. For a discussion on the
emergence of psychiatric autopsies, see Eric J.
Engstrom, Clinical Psychiatry in Imperial Germany:
A History of Psychiatric Practice (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004), 96–8.
20Griesinger, Mental Pathology, op. cit. (note 17),
209–72.
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398thoughts of suicide. If patients are not treated quickly, their mental state deteriorates, and
they start to experience delusions, often of a religious nature. This is the progression
from simple to delusional melancholia that, if left untreated, may eventually progress
into mania and dementia.
21
Clinical depression is a mood disorder characterised by depressed mood, inertia, appe-
tite changes, lethargy, indifference, difficulty thinking and concentrating, feelings of
guilt and worthlessness, and thoughts of suicide.
22 The condition strikes women to a
much larger extent than men.
23 External factors and internal brain chemistry are seen
to work in conjunction to produce morbid symptoms. Internally, the illness is linked to
deficiencies of a number of neurotransmitters, particularly serotonin and dopamine.
The drugs currently most favoured to treat this condition are believed to regulate postsy-
naptic re-uptake of serotonin, thus improving and stabilising mood.
24
However, while we are dealing with two separate disease concepts, both of which
must be subjected to closer historical scrutiny, they are made meaningful through the
same metaphor. The idea that emotional reactions occur reflexively and involuntarily
in response to internal and external stimuli persists in the present and continues to
make possible and plausible the concept mood disorders.
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